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ABSTRACT: The Single European Sky and the Open Skies Agreements introduced a 
fierce competition both in the European and in the International Market for air trans-
port. Former flag carriers found out that they did not just have to compete with other 
carriers, but also with new business models such as low-cost carriers and the use of the 
new information technologies to manage their business (for example, the use of Big 
Data and algorithms to determine the optimal prices and capacities of their flights). 
In order to survive in this competitive environment, air carriers need to adopt strate-
gical and structural decisions to adapt their sizes and scopes to the new requirements 
of the market. Co-operation agreements, joint ventures and mergers play a significant 
role in this process. Carriers that are not able to adapt to the new market structure and 
requirements are compelled to disappear. The cases of Air Berlin or Germania are two 
good examples of this. 
In the last years, the European Commission has analysed and cleared many concen-
trations and co-operation agreements in this sector, most of the times subject to con-
ditions in order to ensure that the operation did not jeopardize competition neither 
raised entry barriers, especially in congested airports. These operations need to be 
considered not only taking into account the individual market players – the carriers –, 
but also considering the airline alliances in which they participate (mainly OneWorld, 
SkyTeam and Star Alliance). 
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The problem has also to be addressed within the current debate about whether 
European competition rules should foster the creation of European champions, in 
this case, by facilitating the formation of big European carriers or alliances that may 
compete worldwide. 
In the last month the Spanish former flag carrier Iberia announced the acquisition of 
AirEuropa, an operation that raises concerns about competition in many national and 
international routes (mainly from Europe to Latin America and the Caribbean) as it 
may hinder the access to slots in the airport of Madrid-Barajas, which would become 
the fifth biggest hub in Europe. It is relevant to consider if the doctrine set by the 
European Commission up to now is still appropriate to address this operation. 
KEYWORDS: Air transport, mergers, conditions, barriers to entry, slots. 
I.  Context: the consolidation of the european air transport market 
almost thirty years after the liberalization
Almost thirty years after its liberalization, the European market for air 
transport services has not yet reached its maturity. In the last years we have 
gone through a period of changes in the industry, where the old national 
and flag carriers had to adapt themselves to a new market configuration 
open to competition. Carriers not only had to compete against other 
countries’ airlines attracting new clients and covering the most profitable 
routes, but also new carriers based on brand-new business models entered 
in the market, changing the rules of the game. 
Growing competition in the market forced existing companies to be 
more efficient in the provision of their services and to adopt new strategies 
to meet the requirements of customers that now had a greater choice. As 
prices went down and the number of available routes increased – espe-
cially those connecting different member States –, companies needed to 
improve their offer to make their services more attractive to customers. 
The liberalisation of the market meant competition: airlines that used 
to have a monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position in certain routes 
now faced the actual or potential competition of other carriers1. To keep 
their success, these companies had to offer better prices and services to the 
1 See Alberto Ruiz Ojeda and Gabriel Benítez Morcillo, “Cielo único europeo y cielos abier-
tos transatlánticos. Bases de la nueva regulación para la competencia en el transporte aéreo”, in 
Derecho de la Regulación Económica, ed. Santiago Muñoz Machado, Vol. VI Transportes (Madrid: 
Iustel, 2011), 693 ff.; María Victoria Petit Lavall, “Las compañías aéreas y la liberalización del trans-
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customers, and they also had to work on passengers’ loyalty (for example, 
by establishing Frequent Flyers Programmes).
This context of rising competition forced airlines to adopt new behav-
ioural and structural strategies. Cooperation became the key to survive in 
the new environment, as it was the most effective way to increase the offer 
and reduce prices. This led airlines to cooperate with each other imple-
menting soft and hard agreements. The former implied the building of 
strategic alliances and partnerships among airlines (normally) covering 
different geographical areas2 as the conclusion of different kinds of col-
laboration agreements, such as pools, revenue pools, interlining, code-
sharing or blocked space agreements3. Different airlines also created joint 
ventures to enter into new markets or to jointly exploit a strategic route4. 
But along with these contractual measures some structural (hard) con-
centration strategies had to be taken. To survive in the new and competi-
tive market, companies had to adapt their dimension and structures to 
become more efficient. They had to strengthen network business models 
that allowed them to enjoy the economies of scope and scale. This led the 
bigger airlines to plan mergers and acquisitions of other carriers to rein-
force their position in the market, gaining dominance in some routes. 
At the same time, competition in the market fulfilled its function of 
being an exit mechanism for the less efficient companies. Airlines with the 
poorest performance soon had to file for bankruptcy5 or they had to wind 
up their businesses, selling their assets to other airlines6. 
However, the European air transport market structure has not yet 
reached its optimal dimension. If we compare the data with a comparable 
porte aéreo”, in Derecho Aéreo y del Espacio, ed. Maria José Morillas Jarillo, Maria Victoria Petit 
Lavall, Maria Jesús Guerrero Lebrón (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2014), 241 ff. 
2 Kai Hüschelrath and Kathrin Müller, “Airline networks, mergers, and consumer welfare”, 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH (ZEW), Discussion Paper, 13-028 (2013).
3 On these agreements, see María Victoria Petit Lavall, Los acuerdos entre compañías aéreas en la 
normativa comunitaria liberalizadora del sector aéreo (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2000). 
4 See Robert J. Calzaretta, Yair Eilat and Mark A. Israel, “Competitive effects of international air-
line cooperation”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics 13, no. 3 (2017): 501-548. 
5 For instance, Brussels Airlines, Monarch, AirBerlin or, more recently, Alitalia, Primera Air 
(JetX), Flybmi, Germania, Vlm, Cobalt Air, Azur Air, Small Planet Airlines, SkyWork or WOW 
Air. 
6 This was the case considered by the European Commission Decision of 28 February 1997, British 
Airways/Air Liberté, case M.857; decisions of 12 December 2017, Easyjet/Certain AirBerlin Assets, 
case M.8672, and of 21 December 2017, Lufthansa/Certain AirBerlin Assets, case M.8633; and, more 
recently, European Commission Decision of 5 July 2019, Connect Airways/Flybe, case M.9287. 
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market as the one of the United States, we can clearly see that there are 
still too many air carriers based in Europe. Currently there are about 135 
scheduled airlines set in Europe7, whilst in the US there are less than 60. 
Obviously, there are significant differences between the European and the 
American market: the population in Europe (above 512 million inhabit-
ants) is 1,56 times larger than the American (about 327 million), and the 
national boundaries still make a difference. The number of airlines for a 
territory that is half the American dimension (4,476 million square kilom-
eters vs. 9,834) still seems to be too high. Also the level of concentration in 
the market is different: according to IATA, in the US the four largest carri-
ers by passengers (American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Southwest Airlines 
and United Airlines) represent about 67% of the market share, whilst the 
larger EU carriers (Lufhansa, Ryanair, IAG and AirFrance/KLM) only 
represent a 42,9%. The international competitiveness of the companies is 
also a factor to be considered: none of the European largest airlines is in 
the World’s top-5 ranked by total scheduled passengers/kilometers flown 
(American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, Emirates, Southwest 
Airlines). 
These data place the issue within the current debate about the need and 
convenience to foster European champions in different strategic indus-
tries8. Not being that debate the point of this article, we will just keep this 
conclusion: according to these facts, European aviation industry has not 
yet achieved its optimal dimension. The trend of the past years towards the 
consolidation of the industry is a signal that market integration is reach-
ing its maturity. Nevertheless, from a competition law point of view, these 
changes may create a more concentrated market structure and lead to 
the reduction of competition at the expense of customers and the general 
welfare. 
This article studies the analysis performed by the European Commission 
when assessing the notification of mergers of airlines. It will focus on the 
criteria adopted for the definition of the relevant market and on the condi-
tions most generally imposed to guarantee that authorised concentrations 
do not harm competition. The reasoning is placed in the current moment 
of digital transformation, where new determinants of market power have 
7 With an historical peak of 180 airlines by 2003. 
8 This hot debate was generated in Europe after the Commission’s prohibition of Siemens’ pro-
posed acquisition of Alstom, as it implied a crash between the industrial and the competition poli-
cies. See Commission Decision of 6 February 2019, Siemens/Alstom, case M.8677. 
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become more and more relevant, also for the air transport industry. Thus, 
the market power of airlines also has to be considered with reference to the 
use of big data and the adoption of decisions using algorithms and artificial 
intelligence. The use of the new technological possibilities is introducing a 
substantial change in the business model of most companies as they have 
more information about the preferences and behaviour of the passengers, 
with an impact in the fixation of prices (more dynamic and personalised) 
or the greater flexibility in the management of capacities and risks. 
II. Business models and tipologies of air carriers
The changes introduced by the liberalisation of air transport and the pos-
sibilities offered by data technologies have influenced the way airlines pro-
vide their services, affecting their very business models9. Traditionally, air 
transport services were based either on hub-and-spoke or in point-to-point 
systems. Most of the companies however are in between, acting mostly on 
the base of a centralised or decentralised network. 
Airlines implementing a business model based on a hub-and-spoke 
structure design their routes scheme by establishing an airport as the core 
point of the system – the hub – from where connections are traced. The 
main advantage of this business model is that it allows to create a large 
matrix of lights connecting a high number of cities in convenient time and 
economic conditions by providing one-stop services. It allows to reduce 
fixed costs and to bear less organisational risks as the number of estab-
lished routes is lower than the one needed to perform a direct connection 
between each single pair of cities. 
The way carriers articulate their business under the hub-and-spoke 
model has evolved. Firstly, airlines tend to design their networks by estab-
lishing more than just one hub (multi-hub-and-spoke networks). And, 
secondly, airlines are also taking advantage of the use of collaboration 
agreements to expand their networks by integrating strategic alliances or 
entering into different kinds of contracts such as interlining or code-shar-
ing with other companies. These agreements allow the sale of combined 
9 A detailed analysis of the different business models, their implications and evolution is offered by 
the Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt E.V. (DLR), Report for the European Commission: 
“Analyses of the European air transport market: Airline business models”, Reichmuth ed. (2008), 
accessed January 25, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/doc/
abm_report_2008.pdf. See Oriol Lordan, “Study of the full-service and low-cost carriers”, Journal 
of Industrial Engineering and Management 7, 5 (2014): 1115.
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tickets joining a part of the journey performed by one airline and the rest 
by the other, which results in an increase of the number of leg-routes con-
nected to the hub and, finally, in the possibility to offer more points of 
origin or destination without the need to incur in the costs and risks of 
establishing a new own route. 
By contrast, companies acting under a point-to-point model directly 
connect the two concerned cities, that is, without performing a scale in 
between. This model offers passengers limited – or no – possibilities of 
connecting with other flights to arrive to a different destination. The ser-
vices offered by these airlines are normally short or medium haul routes. 
This business model is mostly used by low cost carriers. Instead of setting 
a hub airport, these airlines establish different base airports where they 
locate their aircrafts and staff teams, planning their daily operations from 
them. The main advantage of this system is that it grants airlines a huge 
flexibility to easily meet the demand. In recent years this model has also 
evolved, changing its features to become more competitive. In the aim to 
expand their catchment area, low-cost companies operating on a point-
to-point system have begun to offer their passengers transfer services – 
mainly by bus – from the airports they connect to other relevant cities not 
far away from that point10. Along with that, some low-cost companies are 
beginning to offer point-to-point services in the long haul. 
On the base of these two archetypical business models, four categories of 
airlines can be identified according to the way they perform their activities: 
1. Full-Service Network Carriers (FSNC). This was the model that the 
former flag carriers adopted as they adapted to the liberalised mar-
ket and is nowadays the model of some of the largest European air-
lines. This kind of companies offer a broad range of flights mainly 
based on a hub-and-spoke – or multiple-hub-and-spoke – system. 
These services are combined in certain cases with point-to-point 
flights. These airlines market their services offering a wide variety 
of services and class options. Their offer is normally complemented 
by strong loyalty programmes (Frequent Flyers Programmes, FFP) 
to make it more attractive for business passengers.
10 For example, Ryanair offers transfer services from the airport of Bergamo to Milan, from 
Memmingen to Munich or from Girona to Barcelona and different Costa Brava cities.
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2. Low-Cost Carriers. These represent the antagonistic business model 
to FSNCs. Low-cost carriers focus their business in the offer of 
more economic flights, normally under a point-to-point system. 
These airlines compete in prices reducing their operational costs to 
the minimum. To do that, these carriers offer very few and limited 
additional services or, when they offer these services, they do so in 
exchange of an extra charge11. Another way to reduce their costs is 
by offering flights connecting secondary airports, as airport charges 
and the costs of operational services are significantly lower in these 
facilities. 
3. Holiday carriers, leisure carriers or charter airlines. This kind of 
carriers base their activity in the supply of non-scheduled flights to 
tourists12. Charter airlines normally cover routes where there is no 
scheduled airline, connecting their flights offer to the services of a 
travel agency that integrate them in travel packages. Rarely these 
companies offer independent flights, as their services are generally 
integrated in package holidays offered by tour operators. In some 
cases, the very tour operator is the owner of the carrier or they inte-
grate the same group (e.g. TUI). 
4. Regional carriers, commuter carriers or feeder airlines. These compa-
nies cover regional flights connecting secondary cities to bigger ones 
or to the hub airport of other companies. Their activity is thus based 
in the offer of a feeder service to major hubs where larger compa-
nies operate13, and this grants the passengers of a certain geographic 
area access to a greater choice of destinations. In many cases, these 
11 The tendency to consider some services as additional to the transport can be questioned in some 
cases. This has happened with the Ryanair policy to consider the transport of cabin luggage as an 
additional service subject to an extra charge. This clause has already been declared unfair by sev-
eral courts. See, for instance, judgment of 24 October 2019 of the Spanish Juzgado de lo Mercantil 
No. 13 of Madrid, no. 373/2019; or in Italy, delibera of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato of 22 February 2019 (Ryanair) and of 20 February 2019 (Wizzair). 
12 The European Commission has defined them by considering that “Charter flights, as opposed 
to scheduled flights, are usually defined as air transport services that take place outside normal 
schedules, normally through a hiring arrangement with a particular customer (in particular a tour 
operator). Charter companies usually operate on a seasonal basis with a relatively low frequency 
of flights, in response to the requirements of tour operators (for example, once a week on Saturday, 
only during the summer season)”, decision of 12 July 2018, Ryanair/Laudamotion, case M.8869, 
paragraph 150. 
13 Una McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds? Is the European Commission’s analysis of the ‘relevant 
market’ in airline mergers appropriate?”, Annals of Air and Space Law XXXIX (2014): 600. 
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companies operate routes covered by public service obligations or 
they obtain public subsidies for the connection of certain regions. 
Obviously, the validity of these subsidies needs to be considered 
under the EU State aid rules. 
Nevertheless, in recent times these categories are starting to blur. Low-
cost carriers are offering long haul services and they are broadening their 
catchment areas offering transfer services. Along with that, FSNCs are also 
starting to compete in prices, in order not to lose passengers to low-cost 
carriers14. Their business model is also adapting to the requirements of 
economy passengers. Finally, the incorporation of new business strategies 
enabled by the use and processing of data, such as the advances in dynamic 
and personalised pricing, will impact on the way all these types of airlines 
market their services. 
III. The European Commission’s market definition in air transport
As in any merger control proceeding, the assessment of the Commission 
before a concentration is authorised begins with the notification of the 
merger (form CO) to the European Commission. On the basis of Regulation 
139/200415, this notification will be examined by the authority to assess 
whether the proposed transaction raises problems of competition for the 
single market. If the parties consider that these problems might take place, 
they may offer commitments with their notification to solve the eventual 
restrictions of competition (behavioural or structural commitments). 
If, after assessing the proposed merger and after consulting competitors 
and customers, the Commission does not foresee potential restrictions of 
competition, or considers that these are well addressed by the proposed 
commitments, it will authorise the merger in phase I, declaring that it is 
compatible with the single market. In case the Commission considers the 
need to implement the measures proposed as commitments by the parties, 
its decision will make them binding on the parties. 
14 In fact, according to different criteria, the second largest European carrier is Ryanair, a low-cost 
carrier that has passed over large full service network carriers (and formerly flag carriers) such as 
Iberia, British Airways or AirFrance/KLM. 
15 Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004, of 20 January 2004, on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings (OJ L-24/1-22).
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Otherwise, if the European Commission considers that the merger 
raises serious competition concerns, it will open an in-depth investigation 
to evaluate the implications of the potential competition problems and to 
analyse if these might be solved by the acceptation of certain conditions to 
which the validity of the concentration is subjected (Phase II). Following 
the analysis and the intervention of the parties, the Commission will 
declare the merger compatible/incompatible16 with the single market or it 
will condition its validity to the acceptance of the changes and conditions 
imposed by the decision17. 
Article 7(1) of Regulation 139/2004 imposes a stand-still obligation, so 
the airlines involved in a concentration shall suspend the implementation 
of the transaction until the merger has been declared compatible with the 
single market by the European Commission. However, in certain cases 
and under justified reasons, the Commission may lift this suspension, 
normally in circumstances where suspension provided for in the Merger 
Regulation would cause serious damage to the undertakings concerned 
by a concentration, or to a third party18. This has happened with regard to 
the acquisition of airlines – or parts of these – under an insolvency situa-
tion, where the Commission has granted a derogation from the suspension 
obligation19. 
Airline mergers involve a number of transactions that normally include 
the acquisition of carriers – in some cases also secondary, charter or 
regional carriers –, the acquisition of aircrafts and ground facilities, the 
16 So far, the Commission has rejected few mergers, whilst in most cases these have been cleared 
subject to conditions. One of the most relevant withdrawal cases is the one addressed by the 
European Commission decision of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, case M.4439. The rejec-
tion of this transaction was a consequence of the hard effects of the merger, which would have a 
strong impact on the restriction of competition: the merger would lead to a dominant position 
on 35 routes, whilst in 22 of them it would lead to a monopolistic situation. Along with that, the 
Commission took into consideration that the merger implied large low-cost carriers, both estab-
lished at Dublin airport and operating on a point-to-point business model, which resulted in a 
direct competition between them. 
17 On the problems that the imposition of these conditions may raise, see Jesús Alfaro Águila Real, 
“Los problemas de las soluciones: Compromisos en el control de concentraciones”, Revista de 
Derecho de la Competencia y la Distribución 1 (2007): 79-129. 
18 European Commission Decision of 8 May 2018, Ryanair/Laudamotion, case M.8869. In this 
case, however, the suspension was not granted, as the Commission considered that case did not 
meet the legal requirements. 
19 See, for example, the recent decisions of the European Commission of 21 December 2017, 
Lufthansa/certain AirBerlin Assets, case M.8633, and of 5 July 2019, Connect Airways/Flybe, case 
M.9287. 
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subrogation in the position of the former companies with regard to the 
labour contracts with the crew, handling or assistance contracts and the 
acquisitions of slots, inter alia. 
In many cases, the main effect resulting from the merger of airlines is 
the obtention of synergies. The most relevant of these are cost savings 
through the common use of facilities (lounges, gates, check-in counters…), 
contractual economies (code sharing, block space agreements, coordina-
tion of flight schedules), the possibility to exchange flight attendants, the 
possibility to take part in each other’s frequent flyers programmes and the 
possibility to connect new markets by the operation of new routes – par-
ticularly with regard to connecting flights20. Other synergies derivate from 
broader options for fleet planning, the development of strategic networks, 
a larger financial capacity and the possibility of a more ambitious financial 
and investments planning, etc.21 
Market definition is the first step to be taken by the competition author-
ity in its assessment for the authorisation of a concentration. This defini-
tion must be made adopting a case-by-case approach. However, the airline 
industry presents some singularities that require a change in the general 
way market definition rules are applied. We will consider the main deter-
minants used by the authority in this definition, according to the guide-
lines provided by the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant 
market22 and the Guidelines on horizontal mergers23. 
A. Service market
According to the Commission notice on relevant market, market defini-
tion implies a two-step analysis: the definition of the relevant product/ser-
vice market and the definition of the geographic market. In terms of the 
20 Maximilian Schosser and Andreas Wittmer, “Cost and revenue synergies in airline mergers – 
Examining geographical differences”, Journal of Air Transport Management 47 (2015): 142-153. 
21 Adél Németh and Hans-Martin Niemeier, “Airline mergers in Europe – An overview on the 
market definition of the EU Commission”, Journal of Air Transport Management 22 (2012): 46.
22 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community com-
petition law (97/C 372/03), OJ C-372/5-13, of 9 December 1997. Currently this notice is under revi-
sion in order to adapt its rules to the new needs imposed by the data revolution. See Margrethe 
Vestager, “Defining markets in a new age”, Chillin’ Competition Conference (Brussels, 9 December 
2019), accessed January 25, 2020: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/
vestager/announcements/defining-markets-new-age_en. 
23 European Commission, Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C 31/03), OJ C-31/5-18, 
of 5 February 2004. 
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time determinants of the analysis, as the consideration of the effects of the 
merger on competition implies to foresee the situation of the market in 
the moment the transaction is implemented, the Commission will have to 
perform a prospective analysis considering the situation of the market not 
in the moment in which the merger is notified, but in the moment it will 
be effectively implemented. However, this forward-looking analysis refers 
only to the considerations of the transaction effects and is not to be taken 
in the definition of the relevant market24.
Unlike in most of the market definition assessments, the main difficul-
ties when limiting the market for the air transport industry are not related 
to the service definition – the transport of passengers/freight25– but to the 
geographical dimension. The only substantial consideration to be made 
with regard to the product definition is that it refers to the transport of 
passengers from one determined place to another by any means of trans-
portation that guarantees their safety and security and in the temporary 
conditions considered adequate in each case. 
B. Geographic market 
The cornerstone for market definition in air transport is the geographic 
scope. Unlike for other products or services, the geographic market for 
air transport does not refer to a certain area (a city, a region, a country, 
etc.), but to the airports or cities connected by the routes affected by the 
merger26. That is why Commission decisions considering airlines merg-
ers focus on the identification of cities-pairs connections affected by the 
merger – Origin & Destination (O&D approach). In the late years, however, 
24 Miguel Sousa Ferro, Market Definition in EU Competition Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2019), 233, discusses this conception stating that “One cannot carry out a market definition by 
reference to a future timeframe because there are not yet any transactions of the goods and there is 
no future data on which the market definition could be based”. 
25 Notwithstanding the relevance of cargo airlines for competition, in this article we will only 
consider air transport of passengers. Probably the most relevant case – so far – for competition 
law relating to air transport of freights is the cartel entered into by eleven international cargo 
airlines. See European Commission, decision of 9 October 2010, Airfreight, case 39.258 (and the 
re-adoption decision of 17 March 2017, after the annulment of the previous one by the General 
Court on procedural grounds – see Judgment of 16 December 2015, British Airways plc v. European 
Commission, case T-48/11, EU:T:2015:988). 
26 “Whereas geographic market definitions are typically made by delineating a given area within 
which there is interchangeability (or homogeneity of competitive conditions), geographic markets 
for transport services cannot correspond to a given area, but to links between two different areas”, 
Ferro, Market Definition, 228. 
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the analysis has paid more attention to airport networks and the effects 
that the reinforcement of these as a result of the merger may have on com-
petition (both in the strengthening of market dominance and in the even-
tual efficiencies that these networks may produce). 
1. The Origin & Destination (O&D) approach
The assessment of market definition for air transport has traditionally 
been based on the so-called Origin and Destination (O&D) approach. 
Specifically, this assessment criterion affects demand substitution, how-
ever, we consider that it has to be studied before we focus on the factors 
that affect the substitutability of the demand, as this approach creates the 
whole framework in which the merger analysis is made. 
The O&D approach focuses the analysis on the impact of the transaction 
on each pair of cities/airports affected by the concentration. It considers 
that every combination of a starting point and a point of destination con-
forms an independent market from the point of view of the passenger. So, 
the analysis of the effects of the merger should consider the overlapping 
of routes, especially considering those city-pairs that used to be linked by 
flights operated by the involved airlines and not covered by other carri-
ers, as in these routes the resulting entity will have a monopolistic situa-
tion. Obviously, after that the assessment shall also consider the potential 
entrance of other competing airlines in that route, so the analysis should 
focus on the availability of slots in the relevant airports.
City pair or airport pairs? The practice of the European Union in the 
definition of the O&D approach has undergone a conceptual evolution. 
The first decisions considering airline mergers defined this criterion by 
stating that in the mergers of airlines, several markets might be affected, 
consisting each of these in the combination of an airport of origin and an 
airport of destination. Later, the Commission considered that it was more 
precise to consider the combination of two cities – or, broadly speaking, 
areas – instead of airports, as certain cities can be reached in similar cir-
cumstances by more than one airport and, to the extent of defining the 
market from the consumer’s point of view, both airports should be consid-
ered as substitutes27. 
27 Inter alia, the following decisions of the European Commission follow this criterion: decision 
of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraph 12; of 4 July 2005, Lufthansa/Swiss, 
case M.3470, paragraph 11; of 22 December 2005, Lufthansa/Eurowings, case M.3940, paragraph 
10. Also, the Court of First Instance has had the opportunity to consider the substitutability of city-
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However, the transition from an airport pair to a city pair conception 
is only adequate if we consider demand-side substitutability, and not for 
all kinds of passengers28. On the contrary, if we consider supply-side sub-
stitution, the city-pair criterion is not always accurate, as for a number 
of airlines certain airports covering the same area are not easily inter-
changeable. This is because of the network structure of the operation of 
air carriers, especially those adopting a hub-and-spoke business model. 
This kind of companies would much prefer to concentrate their operations 
with regard to a certain city in just one airport. If one carrier has already 
established other routes connecting the concerned city by airport A, serv-
ing other routes to that city by airport B will imply a relevant increase of 
operative costs, as the company will not be able to economise services and 
investments made in airport A (ground handling services, desks, staff…). 
In this second group of cases, the evaluation is also made on the distinc-
tion between ‘main’ and ‘secondary’ airports covering the same area29. On 
a case by case basis, the Commission has assessed the quality of the substi-
tutability between flights, considering in some cases that a secondary air-
port is not a good substitutive of a main one for time-sensitive passengers30. 
Though the O&D criterion is currently the central point in the market 
assessment when considering airline mergers, there is growing literature 
that questions the generalised use of this approach. These authors propose 
that it would be more adequate to take into account other complemen-
tary criteria that may allow to consider the impact of the merger of the air 
transport network effects31. 
pairs in its Judgment of 4 July 2006, easyJet v. Commission, case T-177/04, T:2006:187, paragraph 
56. For a deeper analysis on the use of one criterion or the other, see Jan K. Brueckner, Darin Lee 
and Ethan Singer, “City-pairs versus airport-pairs: A market-definition methodology for the air-
line industry”, Review of Industrial Organization 44 (2014): 1-25.
28 As noted below, the exchange of an airport for another in the same city’s catchment area is not a 
problem for most economy-class passengers, provided that it impacts in lower prices. By contrast, 
business passengers will generally prefer to fly to main airports. 
29 See European Commission decision of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, case M.4439, para-
graphs 69-70.
30 See European Commission decisions of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case. 
5440, paragraph 19; of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraphs 24-35; of 22 
June 2009, Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Brussels Airlines), case M.5335, paragraphs 54 ff.; or decision 
of 14 May 2009, Lufthansa/BMI, case M.5403, paragraphs 45-47.
31 See Pierre Larouche, “Relevant market definition in network industries: Air transport and tel-
ecommunications”, Journal of Network Industries 1 (2000): 421 ff.; Jan Veldhuis, “Impacts of the 
Air France-KLM merger for airlines, airports and air transport users”, Journal of Air Transport 
Management 11 (2005): 12 ff.
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2. Network-to-network competition
The O&D approach is being completed in recent decisions by the con-
siderations of the effects that the merger produces in the building of air 
transport networks. Considering that many carriers base their business in 
a multi-hub-and-spoke model (especially FSNCs), the assessment should 
consider not only the overlapping of routes, but also network-to-network 
competition. Whilst this approach is perfectly suitable to assess certain 
transport segments, such as long-haul flights or those affecting business or 
time-sensitive passengers, network effects are not so relevant with regard 
to airlines that operate on a point-to-point system and/or for economy/
tourist passengers. 
This analysis considers that networks may potentially produce two kinds 
of effects with a different impact on competition. On the one hand, the 
merger produces effects on the hubs under the dominion of the network 
carrier, especially in congested airports. In these cases, the accumulation 
of slots and routes connecting the concerned facility may lead to a rein-
forcement of the dominant position of the entity resulting from the merger 
over the catchment area of the affected airport, limiting consumers’ choice 
and harming competition. On the other hand, network effects imply that 
the result of a merger between two or more airlines is not only the sum of 
the routes served by them. In this case, the whole is much greater than the 
sum of the parts. Adding the routes of the acquired airline to the acquirer’s 
portfolio does not only allow to operate them, but also to build up new 
direct or connecting services that allow the entity to expand its offer, gen-
erating efficiencies that may – and only may – have an impact on prices 
and on the quality of the services. 
These network effects must be considered not only taking into account 
the individual position of the affected airlines, as they are also affected by 
the integration of the companies within a strategic alliance (OneWorld, 
Star Alliance, SkyTeam, etc.) or other kinds of partnerships. These col-
laboration agreements may also imply a larger broadening of the services 
that the merged company may offer, as cooperation agreements such as 
interlining or code-sharing contribute to extend the network of available 
connecting flights, in particular in a market for air transport based on the 
Internet booking of services. 
In this framework, network effects may stress both the detrimental 
effects for competition – if they lead to a more restrictive definition of the 
relevant market – or the positive effects – if they highlight the broadening 
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of the offer – of the merger. That is why some authors have considered that 
if the Commission’s assessment considers individual routes on an O&D 
basis without taking into account network effects, it will not encompass 
the overall benefits of the concentration32. 
In the last decade, since the Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines decision33, the 
European Commission has begun to consider that the O&D approach by 
itself is insufficient to define the relevant market for air transport and that 
it needs to be completed by the consideration of network effects. 
C. Demand and supply factors 
1. Demand-side substitution 
The analysis of demand-side substitution implies considering the range of 
products that the consumer considers substitutes34. From this perspective 
we have to question whether there is any transport alternative for a given 
route that could be considered interchangeable for a certain kind of pas-
senger35. Thus, the typology of passengers and the possibility to operate 
direct or connecting flights are the two main determinants that have an 
influence on the demand when considering market definition. 
Based on an economic approach, the substitutability of the services can 
be analysed by applying the SSNIP or hypothetical monopolist test36. It 
implies to consider how passengers will respond to a small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory increase in price (normally, an increase of about 
5-10%) of the concerned transport service. If, under such a situation, a 
considerable amount of passengers decide to change their demand from 
a service to another (from an airline to other, a route to another, a direct 
flight to a connecting flight, a means of transportation to another, etc.), 
these are considered substitutes and they can be regarded as belonging to 
the same relevant market. 
32 Jan K. Brueckner and Pablo T. Spiller, “Competition and mergers in airline networks”, 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, no. 3 (1991): 323-342. 
33 Decision of the European Commission of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case 
M.5440, esp. paragraphs 11-14. In it, the Commission expressly reproduces the opinion of some 
respondents to the market analysis stating that “the O&D approach fails to take into account the 
hub and spoke function of major airports and the ensuing network effects” (paragraph 13). 
34 Commission notice on market definition, paragraph 15. 
35 Németh and Niemeier, “Airline”, 47. 
36 Commission notice on market definition, paragraphs 15-19. 
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a) Typologies of passengers 
Not all passengers have the same requirements and expectations with 
regard to air transport services. Price elasticity of demand and time sen-
sitivity are the two main criteria taken into account when distinguishing 
categories of passengers. In general, the European Commission has con-
sidered a two-fold division of passengers. This definition of the catego-
ries has evolved from business/leisure passengers to time-sensitive/time-
insensitive passengers, also considering in some decisions the distinction 
between premium and non-premium passengers. 
These distinctions take into account passengers’ willingness to pay for 
the services and a measure of the importance they give to the duration of 
the transport. In general, we can distinguish a first group of passengers 
that is very price sensitive and to whom the specificities of the transport 
are less relevant (duration, airports of origin/destination, etc.); on the other 
side, another kind of passengers uses air transport services professionally 
and, thus, are very sensitive to time conditionings, whilst their demand for 
the services is price inelastic. 
Historically, the first distinction made by the European Commission 
differentiated tourist (or leisure) and business passengers37. Business pas-
sengers normally pay the full-fare tariff, as the flexibility of the service 
(the possibility to change flights or schedules) is relevant for them. This 
kind of passengers normally contract the services short before the moment 
of the flights and because of the high opportunity cost of their time they 
accept to pay more for these services38. Tourists, instead, are price sensitive 
and normally acquire restricted tickets: without the possibility of changes 
(or with a cost) and with limited supplementary services. Normally, they 
contract these services long before the time of the flight and the tickets are 
hardly ever changed or cancelled. 
Considering that the main difference between both categories relies on 
whether passengers prioritise price or time, in the last decade the European 
Commission has based its decisions in the distinction between time sensi-
tive and non-time sensitive passengers39. The bigger differences between 
37 This distinction is drawn, inter alia, in the European Commission Decisions of 22 September 
1997, KLM/Air UK, case M.976, paragraph 24; and of 26 January 2011, Olympic/Aegean Airlines I, 
case M.5830, paragraph 57. 
38 McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds”, 610. 
39 See, inter alia, European Commission decisions of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, 
case 5440, paragraphs 18-22; of 22 June 2009, Lufthansa/ Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Brussels 
Airlines), case M.5335, paragraphs 15-35; of 9 January 2009, Iberia/Vueling/Clickair, case M.5364, 
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both types of passengers can be seen in long-haul flights, although in some 
cases it is also considered in the short haul. This criterion, however, intro-
duces a distinction of the passengers taking into account the possibility 
to substitute direct flights by connecting flights. Non-time sensitive pas-
sengers will be more willing to use one-stop flights if this choice has an 
effect on the price, whilst time sensitive passengers will prefer direct flights 
because of the opportunity cost of their time. 
Thus, the main point of difference resides in the flexibility of the passen-
gers: business passengers are time-sensitive but not price-sensitive, whilst 
tourists are price-sensitive but not time-sensitive. 
The different consideration that passengers give to the existence of loy-
alty programmes (frequent flyers programess) is also a point on which this 
distinction between passengers is based. Normally business, time sensitive 
passengers use transport services regularly and, thus, the availability of 
frequent flyers programmes or corporate contracts is a relevant point for 
the choice between competing airlines. Loyalty programmes also impact 
on the choice between carriers belonging to the same alliance. 
Nevertheless, the European Commission has stated that the difference 
between time sensitive and non-time sensitive passengers is narrowing40, 
though it continues to draw this differentiation for the definition of the 
relevant markets in its decisions. This statement is based on the considera-
tion that the price is also beginning to condition the election of time sensi-
tive passengers at the same time that low-cost carriers are allowing their 
passengers to changer their bookings in exchange of a fee. It seems evident 
to us that there is a change in the business models underneath which is 
making the distinction between both types of clients start to blur41. This 
paragraphs 46-51; or decision of 14 July 2010, Iberia/British Airways, case M.5747, paragraphs 
11-16. 
40 McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds?”, 608. See Commission decisions of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/
Aer Lingus, case M.4439; and of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case M.5440, esp. 
paragraph 19, where the Commission considers that: “the distinction between time sensitive 
and non-time sensitive passengers is becoming less evident, as even time sensitive travelers have 
become increasingly price-focused and tend to prefer a restricted ticket over an unrestricted ticket 
if the price is lower. In fact, in light of the shift towards restricted tickets, most carriers, including 
low-cost carriers, offer rebooking services for restricted tickets (modifying either the date or the 
passenger’s name) for a fee. Nevertheless, the distinction between non-time sensitive and time 
sensitive passengers, and hence restricted and unrestricted tickets, remains important”. 
41 The most recent decision taking into account this distinction between time sensitive and non-
time sensitive passengers is the Commission decision of 12 July 2018, Ryanair/Laudamotion, case 
M.8869. According to this decision (paragraph 139): “in recent decisions, the Commission has 
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difficulty to trace a two-fold differentiation of the treatment of passengers 
will increase with the adoption of new marketing techniques such as the 
implementation of personalised pricing according to the passenger’s pro-
file that airlines can create on the basis of the big data that they grab from 
them. Airlines’ business model is leading to a system based in the offer of 
personalised services and the charge of personalised prices, so that com-
panies can maximise their benefits and – only in some cases – passengers 
can maximise their utility. 
b) Direct vs. connecting flights
The distinction between time sensitive and non-time sensitive passengers 
is based on the opinion they have on the interchangeability between direct 
and connecting flights. In some decisions, the European Commission has 
considered that one-stop flights and direct flights could be considered sub-
stitutable provided that the connecting flights are jointly marketed as such 
for the city-pair concerned and that they only cause a limited extension of 
the trip duration42. 
The impact of the connection needs to be considered within the matrix on 
the determinants of the flight scope. In different decisions43, the European 
Commission has drawn the distinction between short-haul, medium-haul 
intra-European flights44 and long-haul inter-continental routes. However, 
most of the decisions only refer to the distinction between the long and the 
short haul. 
considered that the distinction between TS and NTS passengers has become blurred. Passengers 
are becoming increasingly price-sensitive and more corporate customers apply lowest fare poli-
cies. Moreover, on short-haul flights, the distinction between TS and NTS has become somewhat 
artificial, as the offerings for TS and NTS passengers on these routes has become very similar. The 
transportation of both categories of passengers usually takes place in the same cabin and further 
product differentiation (e.g. included meals, newspapers and magazines) are mostly also available 
to NTS passengers for an upgrade fee”.
42 See European Commission decisions of 12 January 2001, United Airlines/US Airways, case 
M.2041, paragraph 17; and of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraph 21.
43 See European Commission decisions of 22 December 2005, Lufthansa/Eurowings, case M.3940, 
paragraph 11; of 4 July 2005, Lufthansa/Swiss, case M.3770, paragraph 16; of 11 February 2004, 
AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraphs 20-21. 
44 In practice, the category of mid-haul routes is less used by the European Commission. These refer 
to those flights of more than three hours where direct flights normally do not provide the option of 
one-day return trips, so that indirect flights may be able to compete with direct flights. See European 
Commission Decisions of 12 July 2018, Ryanair/Laudamotion, case M.8869, paragraph 145; of 28 
August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case M.5440, paragraph 26; or decision of 22 June 2009, 
Lufthansa/ Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Brussels Airlines), case M.5335, paragraphs 37 ff. 
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The time limit considered as an admissible duration of the connection 
has been estimated in 150 minutes. Some decisions, however, make a fur-
ther distinction considering that the maximum admissible duration of the 
connection to consider one-stop flights as substitutive for direct flights 
must distinguish between time sensitive and non-time sensitive passen-
gers. For the first group the duration of the connection must be under 
120 minutes, whilst for the second the traditional limit of 150 minutes 
applies45. 
In contrast, direct and connecting flights are not normally consid-
ered substitutable for short haul flights. The European Commission has 
expressly stated that only under exceptional circumstances46 can connect-
ing flights be considered as an adequate substitutive for short haul direct 
flights. 
In my opinion, however, the length of a connection, to be considered 
as substitutable, should be considered on a case by case basis, taking into 
account the overall duration of the direct flight in comparison with the 
overall duration of the connecting flights. The shorter the route, the less 
willing passengers will be to admit long connections47. 
To consider both kind of services as substitutable, it is important that 
connecting flights are sold together and under an overall price cover-
ing the different stages of the routes, so that passengers do not know the 
separate price for each one of the single connected flights. In these cases, 
connecting passengers cannot compare prices and airlines can price dis-
criminate between connecting passengers and point-to-point customers, 
45 EC decision AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraph 22. 
46 “In the past, the Commission has considered that on short-haul city pairs indirect flights do 
not provide a significant competitive constraint on direct services. However, this has to be exam-
ined on a case-by-case basis. In exceptional circumstances, indirect flights could exert a certain 
competitive constraint over direct flights. This is the case of some of the routes affected by the pre-
sent transaction where a significant number of time-sensitive passengers even prefer the indirect 
service over the direct one. This is due to the inadequacy of the direct flight to meet the specific 
requirements of time sensitive passengers, namely a high number of frequencies allowing the com-
pletion of a roundtrip in a day”, European Commission decision of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/
KLM, case M.3280, paragraph 20. 
47 This consideration is supported by EC decisions of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, in case 
M.4439, paragraph 290; of 27 March 2013, Ryanair/Aer Lingus II, case M.6663I, paragraph 381; of 28 
August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case M.5440, paragraph 25, of 14 May 2009, Lufthansa/
bmi, case M.5403, paragraph 17; of 22 June 2009, Lufthansa/SN Airholding (Brussels Airlines), case 
M.5335, paragraph 37; and of 4 July 2005, Lufthansa/Swiss, case M.3770, paragraph 16. 
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making one-stop services more attractive for the passengers and, thus, 
competitors of the direct flights of other airlines for the same route48. 
2. Supply-side substitution 
The most relevant criterion considered by the Commission when defining 
the relevant market for air transport industry is the demand-side substi-
tution. After this assessment, however, the Commission uses the supply-
side substitution as a secondary consideration49 that, normally, affects its 
assessment by broadening the market definition performed on the basis of 
the analysis of demand – at least provided that there are not serious bar-
riers to entry50.
Along with the Commission notice on the definition of the relevant 
market, supply-side substitution implies that suppliers are able to switch 
production to the relevant products and market them in the short term 
without significant additional costs or risks to response to small and per-
manent changes in relative prices51. Thus, the consideration of supply-side 
substitutability takes into account the possibility of the competitors to 
offer interchangeable transport services in response to a small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP). 
The most relevant facts that affect the substitution of supply are the 
interchangeability between different airports or between different means 
of transport (aircraft/train/bus/ferry). In some cases, the Commission has 
even considered the substitutability of the destinations. Finally, supply 
conditionings must be assessed within the network effects produced by 
the merger. 
48 By contrast, passengers that contract the different stages of a connecting route with different 
airlines and pay separately for the services are to be considered as “point-to-point” passengers and 
will not be taken into account when considering the substitutability of services. See Commission 
Decision of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, case M.4439, paragraph 68. 
49 Notwithstanding this complementary character, the consideration of these factors must be 
made in any merger assessment. See Ferro, Market Definition, 109 ff. 
50 McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds?”, 612. 
51 See Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, paragraph 40. 
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a) Airports substitution: Different airports covering the same catchment area 
Airports substitution is relevant from both a demand and a supply-side 
perspective. As discussed above, with regard to the demand, the analysis 
focuses on whether two different airports covering the same area may be 
considered interchangeable by passengers. However, if we take a supply-
side perspective, two airports in the same catchment area and regarded as 
interchangeable for passengers may not be considered substitutable from 
the supply-side point of view because of the scale and scope economies 
and the network effects involved. Airlines business strategies constrain to 
concentrate the operations in few airports – hubs or bases, depending on 
the business model of the carrier – to take advantage of these effects. The 
possibility to relocate the routes from one airport to another one covering 
the same area is not a possibility for most airlines because this would imply 
losing the economies produced by the concentration of activities. These 
economies arise from the establishment of ground handling services, the 
possibility to offer connecting flights to other destinations, the possibility 
to maximise the utility of certain resources, etc. Thus, two – or more – air-
ports in the same catchment area might be substitutive for passengers, but 
not for the operating airlines52. 
Airport substitutability is relevant in the definition of the extent to 
which airlines routes overlap, so as to assess the level of competition from 
airlines at other airports and to gauge the entry prospects at other relevant 
airports53. 
Assessing the demand-side substitution, the European Commission has 
laid down the 100 km/1 h rule as a proxy to estimate an airport’s typical 
minimum catchment area54. Pursuant to this rule, an airport is considered 
to be in the catchment area of a city if it is within 100 km or a one-hour 
time driving distance from the city centre55. 
52 See European Commission decisions of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, para-
graphs 17, 26 (focusing on the substitutability of Paris Charles de Gaulle and Milano Malpensa 
Airports); and of 14 July 2010, Iberia/British Airways, case M.5747, paragraph 22 (London 
Heathrow and Gatwick). 
53 McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds?”, 614-615. 
54 The indicative scope of this rule has been confirmed by the Judgment of 6 July 2010, Ryanair 
Holdings plc v. European Commission, T-342/07, EU:T:2010:280. 
55 See European Commission decisions of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, case M.4439, para-
graphs 82-85; of 14 May 2009, Lufthansa/bmi, case M.5403, paragraph 11 (which adds: “Due to 
the specificities of the respective airports, the characteristics of passengers travelling on a specific 
route and other evidence, the catchment area may be wider or narrower in reality and will there-
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The most relevant cases considering airport interchangeability from a 
supply-side are those assessing long-haul transatlantic flights, which nor-
mally connect both shores of the Ocean by establishing hubs from where 
air traffic is then relocated to the final points of origin/destination. For 
short-haul direct routes, in exchange, it is easier to consider two airports 
as substitutes, as neither passengers nor airlines will use them as a point of 
connection for other flights. 
b) Inter-modal substitution: Other means of transport 
Considering that the core of the service market for this industry is just 
the provision of a transport service from one point to another under cer-
tain conditions (time, comfort, etc.), market analysis from the supply-side 
perspective should also take into account the possibility to substitute air 
transport services by other means of transportation. 
This possibility was first considered when assessing the acquisition of the 
remaining shares of TAT by British Airways in 199656. In its decision, the 
European Commission considered that Eurostar’s high-speed train service 
between London and Paris could be a good substitute for flights connecting 
both cities. Some years later, considering the merger between AirFrance 
and KLM57, the Commission admitted the substitutability of direct flights 
connecting Paris and Amsterdam by the high-speed train Thalys. The 
same substitutability for the route London-Brussels by the Eurostar train 
service was considered in the acquisition of bmi by Lufthansa58. 
The assessment of inter-modal interchangeability has to be made tak-
ing into account the concrete circumstances of each case and the deter-
minants of every single route. Factors that impact on the inter-modal 
fore be discussed in greater detail on a case-by-case basis in the competitive assessment”), so as 
decision of 27 March 2013, Ryanair/Aer Lingus III, case M.6663, paragraphs 76-82. 
56 European Commission Decision of 26 August 1996, British Airways/TAT II, case M.806, para-
graphs 19-20. 
57 European Commission Decision of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraphs 
9, 35, 69-74. Both services were considered interchangeable because of their similar duration, given 
that the flight connection city-center to city-center lasted about 3 hours, whilst the required time 
to connect both city centers (the central stations) by train was of 4 hours and 9 minutes. 
58 Decision of the European Commission of 14 May 2009, Lufthansa/bmi, case M.5403, para-
graphs 61-65. Inter-modal interchangeability was also considered in further cases, such as in the 
Commission decision of 22 June 2009, Lufthansa/SN Airholding, case M.5335 (Brussels Airlines), 
considering Brussels-Frankfurt train services; or the Commission Decision of 5 July 2002, 
Austrian Airlines/Lufthansa, relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, COMP/37.730, paragraphs 46, 59-60, 69.
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substitutability include the duration of the flight59, the number of frequen-
cies, the typology of passengers, the reliability, quality and price of the 
services60 or the very physical restrictions of the connected zones61. 
Therefore, the analysis has to be integrated in the singularities of the 
flights (direct or connecting flights) and the typology of passengers (time 
sensitive or non-time sensitive). If we consider the interchangeability of 
one stage of a connecting route from air to rail transport, these alternatives 
could only be considered as distant substitutes in most circumstances62. 
With regard to the typology of passengers, the comfort offered by one ser-
vice and the other is to be considered: time sensitive passengers will be 
ready to pay more for services with significantly shorter duration or that 
imply a more comfortable transport. 
In the assessment of this interchangeability, the Commission has rightly 
considered that another means of transport may be considered as a substi-
tute of flights even when their duration is longer. In the consideration of 
this substitutatibility and under a case by case base, a minimum extra time 
of about two hours is to be added to the calculation of the final duration of 
an air transport service, as this is the average time that has to be invested 
in arriving at the airport, checking in, passing through controls, and other 
dealings needed to catch a flight. Unlike train stations, airports are usually 
located far away from city centres. Following a more economic approach, 
59 For example, in the European Commission Decision of 28 February 1997, British Airways/Air 
Liberté, case M.857, paragraph 15, the flight route between Paris and Toulouse is not considered 
as interchangeable by land transport (train or road) because of the distance between the two cities 
and the much longer duration of the transport by the other means or the number of frequencies. 
60 McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds?”, 616. 
61 For instance, in the European Commission Decisions of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, case 
M.4459, paragraph 296, and of 27 March 2013, Ryanair/Aer Lingus III, case M.6663, paragraph 
422, it was considered that no other means of transport could be considered for services connect-
ing Ireland with the rest of Europe because of the island status of the country and the greater time 
requirements of connections by ferry. Same reasoning was held in the Commission decision of 26 
January 2011, Olympic/Aegean Airlines I, case M.5830, esp. paragraphs 175-180, considering the 
geographic constraints of Greece and Cyprus. 
62 Though in some cases the very airlines offer the possibility to perform a leg transport to a con-
necting flight by other means of transport, such as by train, broadening the scope of their services. 
This offer is possible thanks to cooperation agreements between the airline and the rail carrier. In 
these cases, services must be sold together under a joint price. Consider, for example, the offer of 
AVE (Renfe) trains to connect with Iberia flights in Madrid Barajas. The availability of connect-
ing facilities between the train station and the airport is also a determinant factor to consider rail 
transport substitutive of air transport in these cases, also in the cases in which the train directly 
stops at the airport facility. 
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the assessment of the interchangeability between two means of transport 
must be considered applying the SSNIP test, according to which it is to be 
considered whether passengers would switch from air to rail transport if 
the price of the flights increased by 5-10% for one year. If the passengers 
switch to the other means of transport, it means that both means conform 
the same market, reducing the market power that has to be attributed to 
the entity resulting from the merger. 
c) Substitutability of destinations
In an even broader conception and just limited to leisure passengers, the 
European Commission has considered the interchangeability of the very 
places of destination for these passengers. Considering the merger between 
KLM and Martinair63, the authority has considered the potential inter-
changeability of ‘sun and beach’ destinations, especially in the Caribbean. 
According to this, many leisure passengers would – for example – change 
their flights to Varadero to Punta Cana if there was a substantial difference 
in prices.
In my opinion, this reasoning may be valid when assessing the definition 
of the relevant market for travel services, but not for air transport. In the 
market definition for air transport we should not consider the passengers’ 
purpose with the flight, but the need to arrive to a certain destination. 
The vacation finality is relevant for tourist services, but not for transport 
services. Thus, destination interchangeability should not be an element to 
be taken into account when defining the relevant market for air transport. 
d) Network effects
While network economies allow airlines to obtain significant cost savings, 
these gains are not always passed on to passengers. This leads in many 
cases to a situation in which dominant airlines may abuse their dominant 
position at certain hubs, deterring new entrants64. For that reason, compe-
tition authorities should handle with special care merger cases involving 
an airline that already dominates a hub airport and other carriers operat-
ing an overlapping direct line. In these cases, one may not assume price 
decreases as a consequence of the produced economies, whilst competition 
in the market will have been weakened. 
63 European Commission decision of 17 December 2008, KLM/Martinair, case M.5141, esp. para-
graphs 132-141.
64 Németh and Niemeier, “Airline”, 48. 
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On the other side, network effects may also produce positive effects. 
Thus, in the long-haul hub, competition may increase the consumer’s wel-
fare, as some mergers may reduce the price of long-haul connections from 
certain airports to other distant airports if the merger results in the con-
nection of that city with the hub airport from where long-haul flights are 
programmed65. 
IV. European dimension of the merger
Because of the difficulty to assess the geographic turnover of the trans-
action as airlines mergers normally imply cross-border operations, the 
Commission has generally considered that these transactions have a 
European dimension when they meet the statutory thresholds regardless 
of the method for its calculation66. The main methods that the European 
Commission uses to calculate the geographic turnovers are67: 
• Country of destination method. It allocates revenues from individual 
routes to the country of destination. This method has been mostly 
used when assessing cases involving transatlantic routes68 and 
avoided where this kind of routes were not affected. 
• 50/50 method. It implies to allocate the turnover in a 50/50 ratio to 
the country of origin and the country of final destination so as to take 
into account the cross-border character of the service provided69. 
• Point of sale method. It allocates the turnover to the country where 
the ticket sale occurred. 
65 See Commission decision of 11 February 2004, AirFrance/KLM, case M.3280, paragraphs 10 ff. 
66 McLaughlin, “Head in the clouds?”, 601. See, inter alia, European Commission decisions of 14 
July 2010, Iberia/British Airways, case M.5747, paragraph 7; of 22 June 2009, Lufthansa/SN holdings 
(Brussels Airlines), case M.5335, paragraph 10; and of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, 
case M.5440, paragraph 8. 
67 These are explained in the Commission Decision of 27 June 2007, Ryanair/Aer Lingus I, case 
M.4439, esp. paragraph 18. 
68 See European Commission decisions of 13 September 1991, case M.130, Delta Airlines/Pan 
Am, paragraphs 9-10; of 5 October 1992, AirFrance/Sabena, case M.157, paragraphs 17-20; of 27 
November 1992, British Airways/TAT, case M.259, paragraph 14; of 20 June 1995, Swissair/Sabena 
II, case M.616, paragraph 15; of 28 February 1997, British Airways/Air Liberté, case M.857, para-
graph 8; of 21 December 1998, Sair Group/LTU, case M.1354, paragraph 11; and of 3 August 1999, 
Sair Group/AOM, case M. 1494, paragraph 7. 
69 Luis Ortiz Blanco and Ben van Houtte, EC Competition Law in the Transport Sector (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 191. 
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Currently, the European Commission considers the European nature of 
the transaction if it has European dimension under any of these methods. 
V. Market power and barriers to entry in the air industry
After defining the relevant market according to the factors considered 
above, the authority has to analyse the market power held by the airlines 
before and after the concentration. 
As in other merger cases, this assessment will be based on the market 
shares of each airline70 and the concentration level of the market (meas-
ured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index – HHI), the existence of entry 
barriers on the selected routes, the impact of network and hub effects, the 
existence of substitutes and the potential responses of competitors (for 
instance, if other airlines are also undertaking a merger process). 
If the market power of the resulting entity is high, it may lead to an out-
come of restriction of competition. These pernicious effects may have a 
unilateral nature – if after the transaction prices raise, the quality of ser-
vices and frequencies decrease, etc. – or be coordinated effects – if, after the 
merger, the market structure makes it easier for competitors to expressly 
or tacitly collude, which may result in price increases or other measures in 
detriment of customers. 
The potential level of competition in the market has to be considered 
when assessing the risks of these mergers for competition. Potential com-
petition mostly refers to the real possibility of other companies enter-
ing the market to operate a certain route, but also the possibility of that 
route being covered by another interchangeable means of transport. The 
Commission should thus analyse whether, as a consequence of the con-
centration, the existing barriers to entry in the market increase or if new 
barriers are created, as the existence of these barriers would imply the pre-
vention of real and potential competition in the concerned route71. The 
existence of barriers to entry is not only conditioned by the availability of 
70 According to the Commission Guidelines on Horizontal mergers, paragraph 15, the Commission 
will normally use current market shares in this analysis. These may be adjusted to reasonably 
reflect certain future changes, for instance in the light of exit, entry or expansion. Post-merger 
market shares are calculated on the assumption that the post-merger combined market share of 
the merging parties is the sum of their pre-merger market shares. 
71 See the – classic – analysis of Richard Pryke, Competition among International Airlines (London: 
Gower, 1987), 77 ff., where he considered the problems that barriers to entry would create after the 
liberalisation of air transport. 
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slots in the affected airports, but also by the number of overall frequencies 
of the concerned airlines72. If the number of frequencies cornered by the 
merged undertaking is high, it may generate a situation of dominance in 
those airports that might weaken the position of existing competitors in 
that market so as of potential entrants. 
As it happens in alliance agreements, the exclusionary effect of the 
merger may increase as a consequence of the disposal of a strong frequent 
flyers programme along with other companies. Other network effects, 
such as the dominance of hub airports, may also contribute to the rein-
forcement of this position of dominance. Especially at hubs or dominated 
airports, the refusal to allow competitors to accede to connecting flights73 
may also prevent the entrance to the market and constitute an exclusion-
ary abusive practice (unjustified refusal to contract). 
But not only dominance in a hub or base airport defines the market 
power of merged airlines. A relevant increase in market power may also 
result from the fact that the merging airlines together hold a high percent-
age of the slots in a congested airport, which results in a dominant position 
in that facility. 
The effect on competition of a merger resulting in the overlapping of 
routes covering certain city-pair that are not operated by any other air-
line does not always imply a hard restriction of competition, provided 
that other carriers may potentially enter in that market. In these cases, 
the potential competitive pressure would prevent the resulting monopoly-
acting airline from raising prices, as competitors would see any extra profit 
on those routes as an incentive to enter into them. 
VI. Most frequent commitments during phase ii of the merger
If, after an in-depth investigation, the European Commission considers 
that the proposed concentration leads to an undue increase of the market 
power of the resulting entity that may produce situations of abuse of market 
dominance, it may request from the parties the adoption of commitments, 
or undertakings to remedy the restriction of competition, conditioning 
72 See Lorenz Christian Weimann, Markteintrittsbarrieren im europäischen Luftverkehr: 
Konsequenzen für die Anwendbarkeit der Theorie der Contestable Markets (Hamburg: Dt. 
Verkehrs-Verl., 1998), 73 ff, where he discusses markets barriers using the theory of contestable 
markets. 
73 See European Commission decision of 14 July 2010, British Airways, American Airlines, Iberia, 
case 39596, paragraph 49.
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the clearance of the merger to the adoption of these, according to article 8 
of Regulation No. 139/2004. 
This assessment must evaluate both the effects of competition restric-
tion generated by the merger and the eventual positive effects of the trans-
action. In particular, the conditions imposed to overcome the problems of 
competition that the concentration may rise will aim to reduce the barri-
ers to entry that the merger may have created. Among the most generally 
used remedies, the European Commission normally considers the release 
of slots, the rationalisation of frequencies, avoiding the monopolisation 
of hubs, the commitment to enter into interlining, blocked-space or fare 
combinability agreements, and the negotiation of special prorate agree-
ments, so as to allow other airlines to enter in their frequent flyers pro-
grammes. In other cases, the commitments aim to reduce the scope of 
the transaction: limiting the part of the airline that can be acquired from 
what shall not (for example, not including all the fleet, only authorising 
a partial acquisition, etc.). The Commission may also impose divestment 
commitments. All these measures highlight the need to promote effective 
competition in the market, allowing the entrance of new competitors74. 
For that reason, the Commission normally requires a mix of commit-
ments composed both by structural and behavioural remedies75. 
A. Release of slots
The most significant barrier to entry in air transport markets is the lack of 
available slots at congested airports76. This lack of slots prevents potential 
competitors from offering new services or extending the existing services 
at the affected airports, considering there are no adequate slots to offer 
competitive services77. Not only is the possibility to get slots relevant, but 
the time conditions of these as well, as for certain categories of passengers 
the time of the flights is determinant. 
74 Miglena Rahova, “Remedies in merger cases in the aviation sector: Developments in the 
Commission’s approach”, Issues in Aviation Law and Policy 12, no. 3 (2013): 505 ff. 
75 Manfredi de Vita, “Le alleanze strategiche tra vettori aerei nel diritto comunitario della concor-
renza”, in Studi in Memoria di Elio Fanara, I, ed. Umberto La Torre et al. (Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 
2006): 221. 
76 See Judgment of 4 July 2006, easyJet Airline Co. Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, 
T-177/04, EU:T:2006:187, paragraph 166; Gabriele Silingardi and Dario Maffeo, Gli slots: Il caso 
Italia fra esperienza statunitense e comunitaria (Turin: Giappichelli, 1997): 79 ff. 
77 See Francesco Gaspari, Il Diritto della Concorrenza nel Trasporto Aereo: La Slot Allocation 
(Turin: Giappichelli, 2012): 81 ff. 
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In mergers involving network airlines, the concentration of slots raises 
particular concerns, as these transactions normally affect long-haul or 
transoceanic flights between already congested hub airports. Under these 
situations, the offer to release slots to overcome the problem of the lack of 
suitable time bands for the provision of substitutive services in congested 
routes is paramount78. 
The obligation that the merging airlines assume is to offer the release 
of slots, which does not necessarily mean that those slots are occupied by 
competitors. What the European Commission requests is that affected 
slots are made available for competitors that request them during a deter-
minate period of time (normally 5 years). However, in certain cases the 
Commission has imposed an unlimited obligation to transfer slots79, 
which implies a change with regard to the previous practice that limited 
the maximum duration of the offer to five years. 
In the merging airlines proposals to release slots, the European 
Commission must take into account not only the possibility to connect the 
affected pair of cities, but also the moment of the day for that connection 
(focusing in peak times)80. For these reasons, the remedy to release slots is 
conditioned to the liberation of ‘good’ slots, i.e. slots covering peak hours 
and not creating any operative obstacle to the companies occupying them. 
For that reason, in some cases the Commission has imposed the duty to 
release slots within a window of +/- 60 minutes with regard to the initial 
requests of slots made by the competitors. 
Because of the constraints for the interchangeability from a supply-side 
when the affected routes involved several airports in the same catchment 
area, the Commission may impose the parties the release of slots in the 
concrete airport requested by the potential competitor, so that the grant-
ing of these new slots does not prevent these airlines from integrating 
them within their existing network. 
The release of slots only complies with its goal of overcoming the sit-
uation of restriction of competition generated if these are used by the 
competitors to cover the same routes, that is, to operate in the concerned 
78 See Eugenio Olmedo Peralta, “Asignación de slots y grupos de compañías aéreas: Problemas de 
derecho de la competencia”, Diritto dei Trasporti I (2014): 201-209. 
79 See European Commission decision of 9 January 2009, Iberia/Vueling/Clickair, case M.5364, 
point no. 2.1. ‘duration of the commitments’. 
80 See, inter alia, European Commission decision of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, 
case M.5440, paragraphs 366, 396; decision of 27 March 2013, Ryanair/Aer Lingus III, case M.6663, 
paragraphs 560, 569; decision of 14 July 2015, IAG/Aer Lingus, case M.7541, paragraph 613. 
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markets. For that reason, the Commission requires the new entrant air-
lines that assume the released slots to be effectively independent from the 
merging airlines, that is, the airlines receiving the slots must be carriers 
that do not make part of the business group, nor of the same alliance of the 
merging companies. 
The concrete number of slots that the merging airlines will have to 
release will depend on the number of frequencies for the relevant city-pair 
jointly covered by the parties. It will also depend on the number of fre-
quencies offered by other competitors. The compliance with this obliga-
tion to release slots may be established for free or in exchange of a fair and 
reasonable price81. 
Normally the compliance with these obligations to liberate slots is artic-
ulated by means of a flexible proceeding, conditioning the transfer to the 
quantity of frequencies offered by other airlines for the same route. These 
commitments normally imply that if the competitors in the route overpass 
a certain number of daily or weekly frequencies, the obligation to release 
slots by the merging airlines becomes ineffective. In case of a reduction 
of the amount of frequencies offered by the competitors, the obligation to 
release slots reawakens. 
To avoid abusive practices, airlines acquiring these slots are required to 
have exhausted their slots portfolio in the concerned airport. This means that 
competitors may not benefit from this liberation of slots if they have at their 
disposal a number of non-used slots at that airport. Along with that, to opt to 
acquire the released slots, competitor airlines must have exhausted any other 
possibility to obtain the required slots by the general allocation system82. 
Another condition for the release of slots is that the acquiring airlines 
comply with certain rules to ensure that these slots are not wasted, except 
in those cases of eventual cancellations because of technical or other justi-
fied reasons, according to Regulation no. 95/03. 
In the light of the proposal for a new regulation on slots allocation83, it 
is to be questioned if the conditions to release slots may also take the form 
81 See María Cruz Mayorga Toledano, “Los slots como objeto de negocio jurídico en la propuesta 
de reglamento de asignación de franjas horarias en los aeropuertos de la Unión Europea”, Diritto 
dei Trasporti, I (2014): 185-199. 
82 I.e. according to the rules set by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on com-
mon rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports, OJ L-14/1-6. 
83 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for 
the allocation of slots at the European Union airports [COM(2011) 827 final] 1 December 2011. 
This proposal included in the airport package seems, however, to have been abandoned. 
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of an exchange obligation between the companies that want to access the 
affected market and the merging airlines, that is, by means of the second-
ary market for slots foreseen in the proposed regulation84. 
B. Reduction of frequencies
In some cases, especially when the affected routes connect airports that are 
not congested, additional obligations are needed to guarantee that there 
is enough competition in the concerned market. To achieve this goal, the 
European Commission may subject the clearance of the merger to the con-
dition of reducing the number of frequencies of a certain route so that the 
resulting entity does not corner the market. 
Under certain circumstances, the disposition of the routes of the merg-
ing airlines may increase the number of frequencies that the resulting 
entity may offer. After the merger, the number of frequencies offered for a 
certain route may be higher than the sum of the frequencies that the merg-
ing airlines used to offer individually. This is possible because the concen-
trated carriers may use their broad slot portfolio in the affected airports to 
reassign their uses and plan new frequencies. 
The offer of a significantly higher number of frequencies than the rest of 
competitors for a given route produces the so-called ‘s-curve effect’. Such 
an effect explains that the relative number of frequencies offered by the air-
lines on a certain route impacts on the attractiveness of each of these car-
riers from the passengers’ perspective, especially with regard to premium 
passengers. As a consequence, by adding new frequencies, the airline 
obtains a disproportionately higher market share85. This effect is fostered, 
among other dynamics, by the fact that when the jointly offered frequen-
cies increase, the clients of the merging company will have a broader vari-
ety of flights when selecting the retour in roundtrips with significant sav-
ing of time. This factor is of special relevance for premium passengers. 
84 See David Starkie, Aviation Markets: Studies in Competition and Regulatory Reform (Hampshire: 
Ashgate, 2008): 171 ff.; María Victoria Petit Lavall, “La asignación de slots en la Unión Europea”, 
Diritto dei Trasporti, I (2013): 5 ff.; María Jesús Guerrero Lebrón, “La proyectada regulación de los 
slots en la UE. Referencia especial al establecimiento de un mercado secundario de franjas hor-
arias”, Diritto dei Trasporti, I (2013): 135-165. 
85 See Wenbin Wei and Mark Hansen, “Impact of aircraft size and seat availability on airlines’ 
demand and market share in duopoly markets”, Transportation Research 41 (2005): 315 ff., last 
accessed January 25, 2020: http://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_development/omp/funding/LOI/
media/DOC-13.pdf.
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The Commission may also request the freeze of the frequency, i.e. the 
commitment not to increase the number of flights offered on the affected 
routes. 
C. Obligation not to corner hub airports
In some cases, having large slots portfolios in significantly congested air-
ports allows the merging airlines to reconfigure their routes and sched-
ules in a way that they may get an integrated programme of services more 
attractive for customers, so as a better temporalization of their services 
– especially with regard to connecting flights. 
The dominance of certain hubs as a result of the concentration implies 
a relevant barrier to entry that prevents other competitors from entering 
in the affected routes or expanding their services. The dominance of a hub 
allows to enjoy economies of scale and scope, as the airlines controlling 
them may distribute their fixed costs between a large number of routes. 
It also allows these airlines to get an increased brand recognition at the 
same time that it improves the capacity of the carrier to catch corporate 
customers, making its frequent flyers programme more attractive for pas-
sengers in the hub catchment area. From an operative point of view, the 
dominance of a hub airport produces significative positive effects for the 
building of a route network that allows to feed the flights from the hub by 
connections with other airports86. 
Especially relevant barriers to entry are produced when the merger 
involves airlines that have their main hub in different airports located far 
away from one another and which are connected by some of the common 
routes. In this case the concentration allows to create a bigger network 
with the integration of the previous ones. 
D.  Allow competitors to enter into interlining and special pro rate 
agreements
The dominance of the flight frequencies offered for a certain route benefits 
the bigger airlines, creating a strong barrier for competitors that want to 
enter or expand their presence in that route. The obligation to enter into 
interlining agreements tries to overcome this effect. By means of these 
agreements certain airline commits to accept passengers holding tickets 
86 On the American experience, see Federico Ciliberto and Jonathan W. Williams, “Limited access 
to airport facilities and market power in the airline industry”, Journal of Law and Economics 53, 
no. 3 (2010): 467-495.
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issued on behalf of other carrier, setting the contract the conditions for 
the acceptance of the passengers with tickets issued by other companies or 
authorised travel agencies. This allows a passenger to take a journey using 
the services of several airlines, but under a single ticket issued by one of 
them87. 
By means of the commitment to enter into interlining agreements with 
other companies, the Commission tries to reduce the negative network 
effects of the airline resulting from the merger with regard to the domi-
nance of hub airports. Its scope is thus to ensure that a third airline that 
covers a route by itself may enter into interlining agreements with the 
merging airlines for a leg-route of the services they offer. This undertak-
ing also aims to avoid the loss of time-sensitive passengers by competitor 
airlines. 
In interlining agreements, tariffs are normally divided between the 
involved companies by means of the so-called straight-rate proration 
clause (SRP). According to this, the tariff is divided between the company 
that issues the ticket and the parties in the agreement taking into account 
their involvement in the global mileage of the journey, introducing certain 
adjustments to take into account the different unit costs of short and long-
haul flights. 
As the implementation of this system may benefit the merged airline, in 
some cases mergers are conditioned to the subscription of special pro-rate 
agreements (SPA). These agreements allow a tailor-made division of tariffs, 
which is more advantageous for competitors. Its terms and conditions are 
to be individually negotiated between the airlines88. 
The commitment to enter into these special prorate agreements is lim-
ited normally to those cases where competitor airlines do not use airports 
connected by hub facilities, but is not conditioned to the fact that the air-
line that enters into the agreement has acquired new slots as a consequence 
of a slots release obligation. For their part, merging airlines will try to limit 
to a certain number the offer of connecting routes they accept to bind by 
these agreements. 
87 Bernardine Adkins, Air Transport and EC Competition Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992): 
30; Lavall, Los acuerdos, 194 ff.; Francesco Rossi dal Pozzo, Servizi di Trasporto Aereo e Diritti dei 
Singoli nella Disciplina Comunitaria (Milano: Giuffrè, 2008): 53 ff. 
88 See European Commission decision of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case 
M.5440, paragraphs 347, 376 and section 5 of the conditions; decision of 5 August 2013, US 
Airways/American Airlines, case M.6607, paragraphs 165-169, 187-190, and section 5 of the condi-
tions; also in decision of 14 November 2014, Alitalia/Etihad, case M.7333. 
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E. Blocked space agreements
Even when this has not yet been considered for mergers, in some cases involv-
ing the creation of joint ventures, such as the ones created by KLM and Alitalia89 
and by Lufthansa and Austrian Airlines90, the European Commission has 
conditioned the operation to entering into blocked space agreements. By 
means of this contract, the joint venture assumes the obligation to reserve a 
certain capacity in their flights offer to be sold by competitor airlines91. 
F. Inter-modal services 
In certain cities and facilities, the merger might be conditioned to allowing 
the entrance of new operators of other means of transport (rail, bus…) in 
a facility controlled by the merging company, so as to combine the offer of 
both kinds of services. 
G. Measures regarding Frequent Flyers Programmes 
Obligations with regard to the involvement in Frequent Flyers Programmes 
are more used for collaboration agreements and strategic alliances than 
for mergers. However, in some merger cases the European Commission 
has established the obligation to grant other airlines access to these 
programmes92. 
By means of these undertakings, the merging airline commits to allow 
the access of competitors to their loyalty programmes for the routes con-
cerned. Entrance in these programmes is to be made at request of the 
89 European Commission decision of 11 August 1999, KLM/Alitalia, case JV.19. 
90 European Commission decision of 5 July 2002, Deutsche Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case 
37.730, where this commitment is defined stating that: “At the request of a new entrant, the Parties 
shall enter into a blocked space agreement pertaining to the new entrant city pair(s) operated by 
it if the number of frequencies offered by it is lower than the number operated by the Parties. Any 
such agreement shall be based on a fixed number of seats (hard block basis) and apply for at least 
one entire IATA traffic season. The number of seats covered by such an agreement shall be a maxi-
mum of 15 % of the seats offered on a particular frequency and in any event not less than 12 seats 
and not more than 25 seats in a particular aircraft. The new entrant shall carry the full commercial 
risk attaching to the seats covered by the blocked space agreement”. 
91 More precisely, these agreements have been defined as those cases when an airline buys a certain 
number of seats in a flight performed by another company under a code (shared or not). The airline 
that acquires the seats bears the economic risk of its sell. In the cases we are addressing here, how-
ever, these are not voluntary agreements, but conditions imposed by the Commission. See Lavall, 
Los Acuerdos, 232-233. 
92 See, for example, European Commission decision of 9 January 2009, Iberia/Vueling/Clickair, 
case M.5364; decision of 28 August 2009, Lufthansa/Austrian Airlines, case M.5440, paragraph 
348; and decision of 27 March 2014, Ryanair/Aer Lingus III, case M.6663. 
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competitor and is normally conditioned to the non-disposal of a similar 
loyalty programme. 
The goal of this condition is to allow competitors to benefit from the pos-
itive effects of the merging airline’s frequent flyers programme in the cases 
where the existence of these incentives might imply a barrier to entry or to 
expand in certain markets (particularly concerning premium passengers). 
H. Compliance with the conditions. Monitoring instruments
In particularly complex transactions such as airline mergers, which may 
raise relevant restrictions of competition, it is fundamental to introduce 
certain mechanisms to ensure the compliance of the conditions to which 
the authorisation of the concentration is subjected. At the same time, it 
will be necessary to introduce mechanisms that allow to monitor and 
amend eventual dysfunctions, so as to react in due course. 
In airline mergers, the commitment to name a trustee to monitor the 
compliance with the content of the conditions during their validity period 
according to the content of the Commission decision that makes them 
binding to the parties is frequent. At the same time, merging airlines 
assume the additional commitment to provide the Commission with any 
requested information about their operations. 
VII.  New elements to be considered in the assessment of airline 
mergers in the data economy
The technological possibilities of our days are changing the business mod-
els in most industries. Aviation is not an exception. Airlines are imple-
menting new marketing strategies based on the catching of data of actual 
and potential passengers, the analysis of this big data, and the provision of 
personalised offers matching the profile of each passenger. 
The way airlines will rule their business in the upcoming years (and the 
measure of their very market power) will be defined by the capture of dif-
ferent kinds of data from the customers regarding their preferences, flying 
plans, willingness to pay, socio-economical profile, etc. This huge amount 
of data will be analysed in real time thanks to the data processing pos-
sibilities conferred by algorithms. And, finally, as a result of this process, 
airlines will be able to make different individual offers according to the 
profile of every single potential passenger. 
The use of big data and algorithms will also allow to base the offer of 
flights on dynamic and personalised prices. The implementation of these 
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techniques will allow airlines to increase their margins of benefits. It is still 
to be considered if this surplus will be passed on to customers by means of 
better services or lower tariffs. 
As a result of all this, some of the assumptions on which the European 
Commission bases its evaluation of the effects of a merger on competi-
tion will change. The differences between FSNCs and low-cost carriers will 
vanish, at the same time that personalised and dynamic prices will make 
the difference between business and leisure passengers superfluous. 
VIII.  (As a conclusion) lessons learned for the next big case:  
the proposed acquisition of Air Europa by IAG
Many are the reasons that lead nowadays to a merger of airlines, such 
as the will to expand the own assets taking advantage of the situation of 
losses or insolvency of other companies or the will to improve the efficien-
cies of an airline by integrating it within a broader network of routes. In 
most of the cases these transactions lead to an increase of the efficiencies 
and economies resulting from network effects. As a result of that, concen-
trations of airlines normally produce two different kinds of consequences: 
on the one side, an expansion of the number of points directly connected 
by one single carrier, that is, a network enlargement, without having to 
enter into collaboration agreements with other companies. On the other 
side, these mergers may aim to reduce the number of competitors, so that 
the resulting entity remains as the only carrier covering a service between 
certain pairs of cities. This latter effect is especially remarkable in cases 
such as mergers of low-cost carriers. 
Because of the broad diversity of the cases it has to address, the practice 
of the European Commission in the definition of the relevant market for 
aviation has evolved over the past 20 years. To give an adequate solution 
to the singularities of each case, the number and complexity of the crite-
ria used by the Commission have expanded in recent decades. In the fol-
lowing years, the general criteria set by the European Commission in the 
notice on market definition will also be updated to accommodate them 
to the age of data. In my opinion, in the next years the need for new cri-
teria to assess airline mergers will increase because of the impact of the 
incorporation of new data-based processes and strategies in aviation on 
the consideration of the market power of the resulting undertakings. As 
noted in this article, the different categories of operations and passengers 
is blurring, which implies the need to introduce changes and update the 
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criteria used by the Commission to measure the effects of these concentra-
tions on competition. 
The new data-based operational models will mostly impact on the mar-
ket power arising from network effects. The European Commission assess-
ments of the effects of the merger on potential competition will have to 
take into account the impact of an increasing market power that the bigger 
airlines will hold as a result of the use of customers’ data. Dominance of 
this data may lead to certain conducts of abuse of a dominant position, 
such as the charge of personalised prices, contributing to a maximisation 
of the benefits. It is true that the new data-based technologies and pro-
cesses may lead to a more efficient management of capacities and other 
operational factors, but it is yet to be seen whether airlines will pass on 
these advantages to passengers, resulting in lower prices or better services. 
These new operational models will impact on the network effects and 
the synergies that airlines – especially the biggest ones – may get. This may 
lead to a new wave of mergers, alliances and other collaboration agree-
ments, not only between airlines, but also including companies operating 
in other means of transport, so that companies may benefit of their net-
work effects, also taking advantage of intermodal solutions. 
Another major trend in recent years is the growing substitutability of air 
transport by other means, thanks to the deployment of new high-speed 
rail networks. The bigger environmental commitment of many companies 
and users also impacts on rail companies’ increasing competition. The 
preference of passengers for fewer polluting solutions is producing that, on 
the demand-side perspective, rail transport is becoming a better substitute 
to air transport, with the effect of an expansion of the relevant market.
In my view, however, the network effects produced by the mergers of 
airlines are not receiving the relevance they deserve in the European 
Commission’s assessment. This may well be a consequence of the difficulty 
of economic calculations of their impact in market analysis. 
In this framework of the debate on the need for new criteria to assess the 
impact of airlines’ collaboration agreements and concentrations on com-
petition, the European Commission will have to face another major case in 
the next months. Last November 2019 IAG Group – integrated by Iberia, 
British Airways, Vueling and Aer Lingus – announced the acquisition of 
Air Europa – Spain’s second largest airline, with a significative presence in 
transoceanic flights. The transaction is supposed to be closed in the second 
semester of 2020. 
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The competition assessment of this IAG/Air Europa merger will be a lit-
mus test for the European Commission, as the concentration will not only 
produce the overlapping of many routes, but also highly significant net-
work effects, as Iberia will consolidate its almost monopolistic situation in 
Madrid hub airport Barajas. The resulting airline will become monopolist 
in many regional, European and transatlantic routes. The clearance of this 
merger will only be possible in exchange for large conditions, mostly refer-
ring to divest obligations, the liberation of a significant number of slots 
and the adoption of other measures to avoid that the entity takes exclusive 
control of Madrid’s hub airport. The impact of this new merger and the 
instruments that the Commission will use to assess its effect on competi-
tion are yet to be seen. However, it seems to me a good opportunity for the 
competition authority to pilot new and more modern criteria to assess the 
effects of this concentration on competition. 
IX. Bibliography
Adkins, Bernardine. Air Transport and EC Competition Law. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1992.
Águila Real, Jesús Alfaro. “Los problemas de las soluciones: Compromisos en el control 
de concentraciones”. Revista de Derecho de la Competencia y la Distribución 1 (2007): 
79-129.
Blanco, Luis Ortiz, and Ben van Houtte. EC Competition Law in the Transport Sector. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
Brueckner, Jan K., and Pablo T. Spiller. “Competition and mergers in airline networks”. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 9, no. 3 (1991): 323-342.
Brueckner, Jan K., Darin Lee, and Ethan Singer. “City-pairs versus airport-pairs: 
A market-definition methodology for the airline industry”. Review of Industrial 
Organization 44 (2014): 1-25.
Calzaretta, Robert J., Yair Eilat, and Mark A. Israel. “Competitive effects of interna-
tional airline cooperation”. Journal of Competition Law & Economics 13, no. 3 (2017): 
501-548.
Ciliberto, Federico, and Jonathan W. Williams. “Limited access to airport facilities and 
market power in the airline industry”. Journal of Law and Economics 53, no. 3 (2010): 
467-495.
De Vita, Manfredi, “Le alleanze strategiche tra vettori aerei nel diritto Comunitario 
della Concorrenza”. In Studi in Memoria di Elio Fanara, I, edited by Umberto La 
Torre, Giovanni Moschella, Francesca Pellegrino, Maria Piera Rizzo, and Giuseppe 
Vermiglio, 203-226. Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 2006. 
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